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Discussion
Raymond F. Hopkins 
Department of Political Science 
Swarthmore College
D. Gale Johnson has prepared a lucid and persuasive assessment of 
the current world food situation. I am flattered that he invited me, a 
political scientist, to comment on his paper. I presume from this that 
he wanted some controversy; I shall try not to be disappointing, following 
the basic premise that more is gained from exploring disagreements 
than points of agreement.
Although most of my comments differ from Johnson’s interpretations, 
I find myself more in agreement than disagreement with his paper. In 
particular, I agree that prospects for food shortages and high prices were 
exaggerated during the panic market period of 1973-1975, and they 
continue to be exaggerated by some scholars. Furthermore, trends have 
been favorable since the 1950s in per capita food production and grain 
trade. These facts are unassailable, as is Professor Johnson’s conclusion 
that the growth in grain imports during the 1970s is principally attrib­
utable to socialist and newly industrializing countries (NICs), not the 
poorest developing countries. Finally, I admire the way the paper takes 
to task some of the forecasts of tight food supplies by the year 2000. 
In addition to the specific points Professor Johnson makes, there is 
good reason to be extremely skeptical of such long-range forecasts in 
general. More often than not such forecasts prove to be grossly in error, 
as studies of past forecasting have shown; policy-makers are well advised 
to treat such long-range forecasts with extreme skepticism.* The shift 
in focus in the paper to the decade of the 1980s is, I believe, about 
right for informed judgment. Regrettably, few policy decisions rest upon 
considerations of even this more reasonable future concern; rather, most 
policies are driven by something between last year’s conditions and an 
eighteen-month forward expectation.
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Let me turn now to some criticisms. There is quite a dark side to 
Johnson’s characterization of the last few decades as “things getting 
better.” I also disagree with his assessment that demand growth will 
be very slow and prices low for the 1980s. I think this forecast will 
prove accurate only if the current worldwide recession continues. Finally, 
and not surprisingly, I see the role of government intervention into 
markets somewhat differently. For me the question is not whether 
government intervention is good or bad, but rather how it can be 
improved in politically realistic ways.
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The Dark Side of the “Things Are 
Improving Slowly” Scenario
Professor Johnson argues that in spite of his cautiously optimistic 
assessment of factors affecting hunger and undernutrition, “there is no 
room for complacency.” This is certainly the case.^ We must be especially 
concerned because two trends other than per capita production are 
relevant. First, most people compare themselves with one another and 
compare their situation to their immediate past rather than with that 
of the previous generation. Thus for the 20 to 40 percent of the world’s 
populace that are least well fed, a short-term deterioration in their 
condition or an awareness of growing disparity between themselves and 
better-fed populations might trigger serious economic and political 
disturbances. At a minimum, short-term threats to those lacking personal 
sources of reserves and resentment over inequality will increase pressure 
for governments to intervene in markets through subsidy programs. 
Second, many people compare existing food production and distribution 
activities with known potential. Professor Johnson himself goes to some 
length to assure us that the land, water, transportation, improved 
education, and other resources for greater production exist. Is it possible 
that we are falling behind in realizing these possibilities? If the ratio 
of actual to potential world production and nutrition declines—which 
could occur if barriers to innovation and distribution multiply—then 
the apparent modest gains must be seen as especially inadequate.
The forecasts seen as cautiously optimistic by Johnson look dangerous 
to me. The FAO trend forecast projecting a decrease in undemutrition 
from 23 to 17 percent between 1975 and 2000 actually implies an 
increase of 100 million additional seriously underfed people.^ The FAO 
trends, compared to those of IFPRI or Lester Brown, are the most 
promising ones cited. Everyone agrees that much more can and should 
be done to improve trend forecasts. The issue is: How bad would things 
be if trends persisted because either improvements are not undertaken
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or other countervailing forces arise? The answer is quite bad, especially 
in sub-Saharan Africa with its extremely high birth rates.
Africa is the darkest cloud on the food horizon. Professor Johnson 
indicated that “Africa had a constant average level of per capita food 
production in the 1950s and 1960s and a shocking decline during the 
1970s” (p. 8). In his estimate, 1980 per capita production was 15 
percent below 1969-1971 levels, though he doubts this figure based on 
gains in life expectancy. In any event, compared to Asia and the rest 
of the world Africa is the most acute if not the largest problem for the 
current world food system.
Others find the African case, now and for the near future, quite grim. 
In his ministerial review of food in March 1982, Maurice Williams of 
the World Food Council claimed: “Analysis of the African food problem 
reveals a steady deterioration in African food production, far outstripped 
by population growth. The decline in food production per person was 
7 percent in the 1960s accelerating downward with a decline of 15 
percent in the 1970s. The outlook for the 1980s is grim, and hunger 
and malnutrition during the 1980s can be expected to become far more 
widespread.
Our focus is further sharpened by examining wheat trade rather than 
grain trade as Professor Johnson does. Most of the wheat traded goes 
directly to human consumption, while most coarse grain is used for 
feed. The growth in imports for many less-developed countries (LDCs) 
was dramatic in wheat; the impact on trade and potential food dependency 
is probably greater than the grain figures shown in Johnson’s Table 4 
(p. 29) suggest. Sub-Saharan African countries doubled their wheat 
imports between 1974/1975 and 1981/1982; their growth was about the 
same as the Soviet Union’s and China’s and larger than any other 
region’s. Africa, including Egypt, accounted for over 16 percent of wheat 
imports in 1980/1981, compared to 4 percent for Eastern Europe, 13 
percent for China, and 19 percent for the USSR.* I believe LDCs will 
be especially important sources for growth in wheat trade, as well as 
grains. Regardless of how Johnson or others divide the LDCs into 
various subgroups, such as NICs, oil-exporters, etc. (and I think China 
should be included as an LDC), these are the areas of most rapid 
urbanization and highest income growth, and hence the major source 
for expanded grain trade in the 1980s. I expect Professor Johnson agrees. 
Our major differences would be over (1) how tight world markets may 
become given no expected growth in Soviet imports, and (2) whether 
growth in LDC imports can continue in the 1980s as it did in the 
1970s. The answer to both questions, I believe, lies outside the grain 
markets. Simply extrapolating population growth, shifts in tastes due 
to affluence and urbanization, and various production constraints in
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LDCs suggests strong latent demand. If the current world recession ends 
soon—a recession that already may be blamed for the first decline in 
U.S. agricultural exports in a decade—I expect LDC demand growth 
to surpass that of other importers. Pressure for subsidies should increase, 
so that a stable portion of these LDC imports will be subsidized, 
especially those for bankrupt countries in Africa and the Middle East.
The Depressed Markets Scenario
This last point leads me to another area of disagreement. Professor 
Johnson sees “downward pressure on prices [in world grain markets] 
throughout most of the 1980s” (see p. 31). The world food market is 
closely related to the world economic situation. Grain prices were 
depressed in the 1930s not because of high yields, but thanks primarily 
to the world depression; whether trade barriers were the fundamental 
or more coincidental cause of this I shall not say. I am confident, 
however, that with prices as low as they are today, only great gains in 
productive efficiency are saving from bankruptcy those farmers in the 
United States and elsewhere whose incomes are tied to world prices. 
Neither soil erosion nor water shortages should threaten such gains in 
the coming decade. In this longer term with a general recovery in the 
international economy, demand will reassert itself. The resources that 
can allow production to grow will not be free, however. Longer-term 
higher prices for food and water go together in the improved water use 
future that Johnson expects, for example. In the near term, government 
measures such as setting acreage aside are already combining to lower 
production. Hence, I foresee a firming of world prices over the next 
year or two and upward pressure in real terms for the last half of the 
decade, provided there is a general economic recovery in the Western 
world.
Markets and Governments
Weak governments are bad. Most people want strong governments 
and want them to intervene in markets, at least in research and innovation 
markets or the world nuclear weapons market. Food markets are no 
different. People want their government to guard against “excessive” 
risk and regulate free riders from capturing “unfair” benefits. Government 
intervention into food markets is extensive, lengthy, and not without 
bad effects.® Yet I think in his paper Professor Johnson lays too diffuse 
a blame on governments for price instability and barriers to production. 
Of course, he does not criticize governments generally. He finds that 
some public goods provided by governments, such as education, infor-
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mation, roads, and extension services, are desirable. From his writings 
I know he has advocated that governments of wealthy countries should 
play an insurance role to help stabilize poor countries’ food supplies.
I do not understand, therefore, why the paper lays so much of the blame 
for erratic food prices and barriers to production on governments, 
particularly government “intervention.” Less government intervention 
is not a panacea.
I am not arguing that governments do the right thing even most of 
the time. In Africa, bad government policies are certainly to blame for 
a great deal of the continent’s food problems.^ The task is to work to 
improve the role of government in structuring optimal conditions for 
markets to operate in. Probably all observers agree that governments 
help food markets by providing information on crop conditions, by 
supporting research, by enforcing contracts, including futures contracts, 
and so on. Disagreement occurs over how much risk governments should 
cover and what mechanisms they should use. It is not clear that the 
correlation Professor Johnson finds between greater government regu­
lation and price instability for five major traded commodities indicates 
a causal relationship. Surely if we found that governments sent more 
fire engines to fires that did the greatest damage, we would not blame 
the arrival of the fire engines for the losses, nor prescribe their elimination. 
There is, in short, usually a good reason for government intervention 
into social life, and it usually is motivated by a desire to improve the 
life circumstances of people by reducing or sharing risks.
To be fair, I do agree with Professor Johnson that governments can 
distort markets. Europe with its common agricultural policy (CAP) and 
the Soviet Union with its trading and price policies have extended some 
food security and price stability to their populations at a cost of greater 
instability in world markets, just as he has argued. It is correct to assign 
blame to such government policies that thin the world market in times 
of stress as in 1973-1974. These government policies contributed to 
international price instability. The answer is to adjust the CAP, however; 
to advocate abolishing it is simply not practical. There are other 
government intervention policies, national and international, that I 
believe make a positive contribution to the performance of world food 
markets, especially given the other policies that exist. For example, the 
food security for LDCs and the stability of their export demand are 
helped by the newly created International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan 
facility for food imports, by some portion of current food aid programs, 
and by commercial loans under banking conditions facilitated by gov­
ernments. During the current period of low prices, LDCs might even g| 
rationally use U.S. government-secured futures markets to hedge against ^
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future needs and price increases. It would be cheaper than storage in 
an LDC reserve system.*
In conclusion, the issue for the 1980s is not whether markets would 
better serve the world food economy with less or more government 
intervention. Intervention is here to stay. The role of government must 
include providing the confidence and rules to create markets and help 
them function well in adjusting supply and demand conditions.® In­
tervention will also include practices to protect farmers from a prisoner 
dilemma type of ruin. When such policies are shaped, however, the 
problem becomes one of preventing excessive regulation, distortion, 
black markets and so forth on the one hand, and on the other hand 
of avoiding an inadequate government role. Domestic protection produces 
external effects at the international level, so that weak countries and 
producers are faced with either costly policies of self-reliance or excessive 
risk and adjustment costs from their exposure to excessively unstable 
markets. Politics dictates that before domestic stability or income policies 
are altered, however, incentives and assurances will be needed to induce 
the alterations. Whether for farmers in Africa or consumers in the 
United States, the issue is what kinds of government intervention would 
better serve their goals through some balance of efficient production, 
equitable distribution and security of supply.
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